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Is God’s Benevolence Impartial?
Robert K. Garcia
Texas A&M University
In this paper I consider the intuitive idea that God is fair and does not 
play favorites.  This belief appears to be held by many theists.  I will call 
it the Principle of Impartial Benevolence (PIB) and put it as follows: As 
much as possible, for all persons, God equally promotes the good and 
equally prevents the bad.1  I begin with the conviction that there is a prima 
facie tension between PIB and the disparity of human suffering.  My aim 
in what follows is to clarify this tension and show that it runs deep.  More 
VSHFL¿FDOO\,ZLOODUJXHWKDW3,%LPSRVHVVWULQJHQWGHPDQGV²LQFOXGLQJD
patient-centered theodicy—on the sorts of reasons that would justify God 
in permitting suffering, and, that the historical disparity of suffering in-
dicates that these demands are not met.  I conclude that theists should 
disavow PIB or at least consider it sub judice.
,EHJLQZLWKDFODUL¿FDWLRQRI3,%)LUVW,DPFRQVLGHULQJ3,%ZLWKLQ
the framework of what William Rowe calls restricted theism, the view that 
there is an all-powerful, all-knowing, perfectly good being (2004, p. 4). 
The view is restricted in that it doesn’t include any unique claims made 
RQO\E\VSHFL¿FYHUVLRQVRIWKHLVP+RZHYHU,WDNHUHVWULFWHGWKHLVPWR
include the commitment to a paradisical afterlife in which (at least some) 
humans enjoy supremely valuable goods.  This inclusion is tacitly implied 
by most discussions of restricted theism and will be important in what 
follows.26HFRQGWKHSULQFLSOH¶V³DVPXFKDVSRVVLEOH´TXDOL¿HVLWVHQWLUH
claim: it applies to God’s promotion of good and prevention of bad states, 
as well as God’s promotion of equal enjoyment or possibility of enjoyment 
of good states.  Moreover, by “possible” I mean broadly logically possible, 
viz. what is possible within the constraints of both logical and metaphysi-
cal possibility (the latter may be determined by counterfactuals of human 
freedom).  Third, by “promoting the good” I mean God’s actually bringing 
about the good and/or making possible the bringing about of the good.3 
God “prevents” the bad by preventing the actualization of bad states and/
or permitting those bad states which God could prevent only by permitting 
some state equally bad or worse.  Finally, I will assume that different kinds 
RIJRRGDQGEDGVWDWHVFDQEHVXI¿FLHQWO\FRPPHQVXUDEOHWREH³HTXDO´
I will now describe how PIB relates to a widely accepted view con-
cerning the necessary conditions for God’s permission of evil.  William 
Rowe articulates this view as follows:  God would prevent the occurrence 
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of any evil He could, unless He could not do so without thereby losing 
some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse (1996, p. 
3).  Furthermore, Rowe explicates this with a tripartite, disjunctive neces-
sary condition for God failing to prevent any evil: Where E is an instance 
of evil, either (i) there is some greater good, G, such that G is obtainable 
by God only if God permits E, or (ii) there is some G such that G is ob-
tainable by God only if God permits either E or some evil equally bad or 
worse, or (iii) E is such that it is preventable by God only if God permits 
some evil equally bad or worse.  Simply put, for every E, God must have 
DVXI¿FLHQWUHDVRQIRULWVSHUPLVVLRQDUHDVRQFRQVWLWXWHGE\WKHEULQJLQJ
DERXWRIDJRRG*ZKHUH(LVQHFHVVDU\IRU*DQG*LVVXI¿FLHQWO\RXW
weighingly) great to justify the permission of E.
,W LV FOHDU WKDW WKHUHPXVWEHD VXI¿FLHQW UHDVRQ IRU HYHU\(EXW to 
whom must this reason pertain?  Who, exactly, must enjoy G if the permis-
VLRQRI(LVWREHMXVWL¿HG"7KLVDPELJXLW\FRUUHVSRQGVWRDGLVWLQFWLRQ
between two different approaches to theodicy.  To help clarify this distinc-
tion, it will be useful to introduce and adopt some terminology.  In what 
follows, locutions of the form “ES” refer to a case in which person S suf-
fers bad state E.  Locutions of the form “G-for-ES” refer to the good which 
MXVWL¿HV*RG¶VSHUPLVVLRQRI(S (and, thus, for which ES was necessary). 
Notice that it is an open question as to whether or not S herself enjoys 
G-for-ES.  Indeed, leaving this question open allows us to distinguish be-
tween two forms of theodicy.
On the one hand, according to a patient-centered theodicy, the person 
who suffers must herselfHQMR\WKHJRRGWKDWLVVXI¿FLHQWO\JUHDWWRMXVWLI\
the permission of her suffering and for which her suffering is necessary.4 
That is, where ES is a case of person S suffering evil E, S must herself en-
joy the G-for-ES.  On the other hand, according to a non-patient-centered 
theodicyWKHSHUVRQRUSHUVRQVZKRHQMR\VWKHJRRGWKDWMXVWL¿HV*RG¶V
permission of suffering needn’t be the one who suffers.  That is, where ES 
is a case of person S suffering evil E, some person(s), but not necessarily 
S, must enjoy the G-for-ES.
In this way, a patient-centered theodicy puts a more stringent demand 
on the sorts of reasons that would justify God in permitting suffering.  It 
VKRXOGEHFOHDUKRZHYHUWKDW3,%UHTXLUHVSDWLHQWFHQWHUHGMXVWL¿FDWLRQ
for suffering, and thereby requires a more demanding theodicy.  On PIB, 
God cannot promote the good of one person at the ultimate (all things 
considered) expense of another.  If there is only a non-patient-centered 
MXVWL¿FDWLRQIRU(S, then God has either (i) promoted the good of some-
one other than S at the ultimate expense of S, or (ii) prevented the bad of 
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FDVH3,%WKXVUHTXLUHVDSDWLHQWFHQWHUHGMXVWL¿FDWLRQIRUHYHU\LQVWDQFH
of evil.  Accordingly, on PIB, where ES is a case of person S suffering evil 
E, S must herself enjoy the G-for-ES.
5
:LWKWKHIRUHJRLQJFODUL¿FDWLRQVLQSODFH,ZLOOQRZDUJXHWKDW3,%
is hard to square with actual cases of suffering.  I’ll begin with a rough 
sketch of the argument and then present it in terms of a dilemma.
Here is a sketch of the problem.  If theism is true, then it seems not 
only possible, but entirely likely that there are pairs of persons who, rela-
tive to each other, suffer greatly different amounts of evil and, yet, ul-
timately enjoy more or less the same amount of supremely worthwhile 
heavenly goods.  But, since both persons ultimately enjoy the same kinds 
RIJRRGVLWLVGLI¿FXOWWRVHHZK\WKHRQHSHUVRQ¶VJUHDWHUVXIIHULQJZDV
necessary for her enjoyment of those goods.  Thus, if there are goods that 
DUHVXI¿FLHQWO\JUHDWWRMXVWLI\KHUVXIIHULQJDQGIRUZKLFKKHUVXIIHULQJ
was necessary, those goods would have to be something other than (or in 
addition to) the goods she herself enjoys.  That is, her suffering would not 
EHMXVWL¿HGPHUHO\LQYLUWXHRIWKHIDFWWKDWLWEURXJKWDERXWher enjoyment 
of certain goods.  Although such a case seems entirely realistic, it does not 
meet PIB’s demand for a patient-centered theodicy.
The problem can be put more precisely in terms of a dilemma stem-
PLQJIURPWKHGLVSDULW\RIVXIIHULQJEHWZHHQWZR¿FWLRQDOSHUVRQV²)H
licity and Dole—who, if theism is true, surely could have had historical 
counterparts.  Dole suffers the Holocaust, spending many months in Aus-
chwitz and ultimately dying at middle age in one of Mengele’s cruel ex-
periments.  Felicity never suffers anything close to the Holocaust.  In fact, 
she lives a largely secluded and comfortable life, and dies in her sleep at a 
ripe old age.  Both Dole and Felicity go to heaven.  As a provisional state-
ment, the dilemma here is this:  If PIB is true, then either (i) Dole’s suf-
fering the Holocaust was necessary to bring about some good G for Dole, 
a good which Felicity never enjoys—in which case God has ultimately 
promoted more good for Dole, or (ii) Felicity enjoys G by a means requir-
ing less suffering—in which case God has prevented more bad for Felicity.  
To discuss this case, I will adopt the following abbreviations:
• “HDole” is an instance of “ES” and represents Dole’s suffer-
ing the holocaust in the ways described above.
• “G-for-HDole” is an instance of “G-for-ES” and represents 
WKHJUHDWHUJRRGZKLFKMXVWL¿HV*RG¶VSHUPLVVLRQRI+Dole 
and for which HDole was necessary.
6  
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Given their respective careers, at the end of their earthly lives, Dole will 
have suffered more than Felicity.  Thus, HDole (partly) constitutes the his-
torical disparity between their sufferings.
$VZH¶YHVHHQRQ3,%*RGPXVWKDYHDSDWLHQWFHQWHUHG MXVWL¿FD
tion for HDole and—as much as possible—equally promote the good and 
equally prevent the bad of Dole and Felicity.  Thus, given the requirement 
of a patient-centered theodicy, if HDole (Dole suffers the Holocaust), then 
Dole enjoys G-for-HDole and HDole was a necessary condition for Dole’s 
enjoyment of G-for-HDole.  Because Dole died during the Holocaust, we 
may assume that it is only in heaven that Dole enjoys G-for-HDole.  Felicity, 
however, did not suffer much at all, much less anything like the Holocaust; 
she ultimately suffers much less than Dole.  This leaves us with three op-
tions concerning the heavenly goods enjoyed by Felicity:
(A) Felicity enjoys G*, a good of exactly the same type 
as G-for-HDole. 
(B) Felicity enjoys G , a good whose value is equal to or 
greater than the value of G-for-HDole.
(C) Felicity enjoys neither G* nor G .
In what follows, I will argue that none of these options sits well with PIB. 
In fact, they vex PIB with the following dilemma: Either there is no pa-
WLHQWFHQWHUHGMXVWL¿FDWLRQIRU+Dole or God has not equally promoted the 
good for Dole and Felicity.
2SWLRQV$DQG%HDFKHQWDLOWKH¿UVWKRUQRIWKHGLOHPPDWKDWQR
SDWLHQWFHQWHUHGMXVWL¿FDWLRQLVDYDLODEOHIRU+Dole.  Concerning this horn, 
,ZLOODUJXH¿UVWWKDW$LVLPSODXVLEOHEXWLPSODXVLELOLW\QRWZLWKVWDQG
LQJLI$REWDLQVWKHQQRSDWLHQWFHQWHUHGMXVWL¿FDWLRQREWDLQVIRU+Dole. 
Second, I will argue that while (B) is more plausible than (A), it also im-
SOLHVWKDWQRSDWLHQWFHQWHUHGMXVWL¿FDWLRQREWDLQVIRU+Dole.  Finally, I will 
argue that (C) entails a second horn, namely, that God has done less than 
was possible to promote equally the good of Dole and Felicity.
On (A), Felicity’s suffering the holocaust is not necessary for Felicity 
to enjoy a G*, a good of exactly the same type as G-for-HDole.  Trivially, 
G-for-HDole is a G*.  Thus, while suffering the Holocaust is necessary for 
Dole to enjoy a G*, it is not necessary for Felicity to enjoy a G*.  In this 
case, because Dole and Felicity both enjoy a G*, they both enjoy a token 
of the same type of good.  But the fact that these goods are tokens of the 
same type would seem to require that they obtain under at least roughly 
similar conditions.  In other words, it seems that for a G* to obtain, it 
27
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ZRXOGUHTXLUHFRQGLWLRQVVXI¿FLHQWO\VLPLODUWRWKRVHLQYROYHGLQVXIIHULQJ
the holocaust.  But, since Felicity did not suffer anything like the Holo-
caust, it seems dubious that she could enjoy a G*.  Given that suffering 
the Holocaust was necessary condition for Dole to enjoy a G*, how could 
Felicity enjoy a G*?
Second, even supposing that (A) is possible, Felicity’s enjoying a G* 
would suggest that HDole was not necessary for Dole to enjoy G-for-HDole. 
If Felicity can enjoy a G* without suffering anything like the Holocaust, 
WKHQLW LVGLI¿FXOW WRVHHZK\'ROHFRXOGQ¶WKDYHHQMR\HG*IRU+Dole (a 
G*) without his suffering the Holocaust.  In sum, if (A) obtains on PIB, 
then it must be the case that while it was possible for God to bring about 
Felicity’s enjoyment of a G* without HFelicity, it was not possible for God 
to bring about Dole’s enjoyment of a G* without HDole.  However, if God 
could bring about Felicity’s enjoyment of a G* without HFelicity, why could 
he not do so for Dole?
In reply, a defender of PIB might appeal to Dole’s character, Dole’s 
historical context, or counterfactuals of freedom true for Dole.  A defender 
of PIB could claim that the character of Dole was such that HDole was nec-
essary for Dole to enjoy a G*.  In this case, however, the fact that Dole had 
such a character must not be up to God, otherwise, it would have been pos-
sible for God to create Dole with a character which did not require HDole for 
Dole to enjoy a G*.  Rather, the relevant fact about Dole’s character must 
be something which is determined either by Dole’s context or by Dole 
himself.  Consider the former case, where HDole is necessary for Dole’s en-
joyment of a G* in virtue of Dole having a certain sort of character, where 
this aspect of his character resulted from factors out of Dole’s control (e.g., 
Dole’s historical context).  Here it would seem that HDole is not necessary 
merely for Dole’s enjoyment of a G*, but for the actualization of a com-
plex good including both (i) the good of Dole’s enjoyment of a G* and 
(ii) the good of God’s maintaining a general policy of non-intervention 
concerning human character development.  However, the supposition that 
HDole is necessary for the actualization of the latter (complex) good is con-
sistent with it not being the case that HDole is necessary for Dole’s enjoy-
ment of a G*.  In effect, in this case the justifying reason for HDole is not a 
patient-centered reason but a non-patient centered reason, and thus HDole 
is not necessary for Dole’s enjoyment of a G*.  But since G-for-HDole is 
(trivially) a G*, HDole is not necessary for G-for-HDole and the demands of a 
patient-centered theodicy are not met.
Consider the alternative case, in which, due to factors under Dole’s 
(free) control, HDole is necessary for Dole’s enjoyment of a G*.  Here, it 
must be the case that there were no other possible worlds God could have 
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actualized in which Dole’s counterfactuals are such that Dole could freely 
develop a character which did not require HDole to bring about Dole’s en-
joyment of a G*.7  This does not seem plausible.
The case against (A) may be summarized as follows.  First, (A) strains 
credulity.  Because suffering the Holocaust is necessary for Dole’s enjoy-
ment of a G*, it seems dubious that Felicity, having not suffering anything 
like the Holocaust, could enjoy a G*.  Second, if Felicity does enjoy a G*, 
WKHQWKHUHZRXOGDSSHDUWREHQRSDWLHQWFHQWHUHGMXVWL¿FDWLRQIRU+Dole.
I’ll now consider the second option, (B), on which Felicity enjoys 
DJRRG* ZKLFKLVRIDGLIIHUHQWNLQGEXWDWOHDVWHTXDOLQYDOXHWR*
for-HDole (the good for which HDoleLVQHFHVVDU\DQGZKLFKLVVXI¿FLHQWO\
great to justify God’s permission of HDole+HUH)HOLFLW\HQMR\V* HYHQ
though she does not suffer the Holocaust.  Thus, suffering the Holocaust 
LVQRWQHFHVVDU\IRU WKHHQMR\PHQWRI*  7KDW LVDSHUVRQ¶VVXIIHULQJ
the Holocaust is not necessary for her enjoyment of a good at least equal 
in value to G-for-HDole.  Thus, it would seem that Dole’s suffering the Ho-
locaust is not necessary for Dole’s enjoyment of a good at least equal in 
value to G-for-HDole.  However, on PIB, faced with the choice between 
two different but equally valuable goods, it seems that God would actual-
ize the good whose necessary conditions involve the least amount of bad 
states.  We may state this as a general principle.  Where E is some evil 
and G1 and G2 are two equally valuable but different kinds of goods:  If (i) 
S’s suffering E isn’t necessary for S’s enjoyment of G1 and S’s suffering 
E is necessary for S’s enjoyment of G2, then (ii) the bringing about of S’s 
enjoyment of G2ZRXOGQRWEHVXI¿FLHQWWRMXVWLI\6¶VVXIIHULQJ(7KDW
LVLI*RGSHUPLWWHG6WRVXIIHU(WKHQ*RG¶VMXVWL¿FDWLRQZRXOGKDYHWR
involve goods other than (and/or in addition to) S’s enjoyment of G2.  The 
bearing of this result is as follows.  As we’ve seen, under option (B), HDole 
isn’t necessary for Dole’s enjoyment of G , though HDole is necessary for 
Dole’s enjoyment of G-for-HDole.  Thus, the bringing about of Dole’s en-
joyment of G-for-HDole is by itselfQRWVXI¿FLHQWWRMXVWLI\*RG¶VSHUPLWWLQJ
HDole.  Rather, God’s permitting HDolePXVWEHMXVWL¿HGLQWHUPVRIJRRGV
other than (or in addition to) Dole’s enjoyment of G-for-HDole.  It must be 
that HDole LVMXVWL¿HGLQYLUWXHRILWEULQJLQJDERXWDJRRGWKDWLVHQMR\HGE\
persons other than (or in addition to) Dole.  In other words, on (B), there 
LVQRSDWLHQWFHQWHUHGMXVWL¿FDWLRQIRU+Dole.
7KXVRQWKH¿UVWKRUQRIWKHGLOHPPD²RQ$RU%²*RG¶VMXVWL¿
cation for permitting HDoleLVQRWSDWLHQWFHQWHUHG7KH¿UVWKRUQLVWKHUHE\
at odds with PIB.
The second horn of the dilemma is entailed by our last option, (C), on 
which Felicity enjoys neither a G* nor a G .  For (C) to contradict PIB, 
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it must have been possible for God to bring about Felicity’s enjoyment of 
either a G* or a G , either by bringing it about that Felicity suffers some-
thing like the Holocaust (as the necessary condition for the enjoyment of a 
G*) or by bringing about the necessary condition(s) for Felicity to enjoy a 
G .  But both seem like real possibilities for God.  It would seem that God 
would have the desire and means available to bring about Felicity’s enjoy-
ment of goods at least equal in value to those enjoyed by Dole, especially 
since it was not Felicity’s fault that she failed to satisfy the necessary con-
dition for enjoying a G*.  It would seem, then, that on (C), God has done 
less than was possible to promote equally the good of Dole and Felicity.
In conclusion, on either (A), (B), or (C), though it was possible for 
God to do so, God has not equally promoted the overall good and equally 
prevented the overall bad of Dole and Felicity.  However, if theism is true, 
then it seems not only possible, but entirely likely that there be historical 
counterparts to Dole and Felicity.  It seems, then, that PIB is untenable.  If 
possible, theism should do without it.8
Notes
1 Richard Swinburne seems to express PIB when he notes emphatically: “it 
must be the case that the perfectly good agent does all else that he can (compat-
ible with allowing no further bad state to occur) to bring about the good” (1998, 
p. 12).  Since it is a second-order good for persons to have an equal enjoyment of 
the good and/or an equal opportunity to enjoy the good, we may plausibly infer 
from Swinburne’s claim that it must be the case that God does all that He can to 
promote equal enjoyment or equal opportunity for enjoyment of the good.
2 It is tacitly implied in the following way.  Restricted theism is typically 
discussed within the context of the problem of evil.  In this context, a central ques-
WLRQFRQFHUQVZKHWKHU*RG¶VSHUPLVVLRQRIHYLOFDQEHMXVWL¿HGLQWHUPVRIVXI
¿FLHQWO\RXWZHLJKLQJO\JUHDWJRRGVIRUZKLFKVXFKHYLOLVQHFHVVDU\7RPDQ\
however, it seems extremely implausible that pre-paradisical goods are of a value 
and quantity to outweigh the enormity of suffering.  The words of C. S. Lewis 
(2001, p. 148) are representative:  “…a book on suffering which says nothing of 
heaven, is leaving out almost the whole of one side of the account.  Scripture and 
tradition habitually put the joys of heaven into the scale against the sufferings of 
earth, and no solution of the problem of pain which does not do so can be called 
a Christian one.”  Thus, because “restricted theism” is supposed to represent gen-
eral theistic resources for answering the problem of evil, we may take it to include 
WKHDI¿UPDWLRQRIDSDUDGLVLFDODIWHUOLIHLQZKLFKKXPDQVHQMR\VXSUHPHO\YDOX
able goods.
3 An example of the former case would be God’s rewarding a person with 
blissful immortality, and an example of the latter would be God’s endowing a 
SHUVRQZLWKOLEHUWDULDQIUHHGRPFRQFHUQLQJPRUDOO\VLJQL¿FDQWFKRLFHV
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4 Both before and during the conference, Randall Auxier (this paper’s com-
mentator) and I discussed his question of who I am arguing against.  In discus-
sion, I realized that in the (original) paper I neglected to mention Eleonore Stump, 
who holds to a patient-centered theodicy (see esp. her (1985)).  Auxier agreed that 
WKLVFODUL¿FDWLRQKHOSHG
5 William Alston (1996, p. 111) seems to imply a patient-centered require-
ment:  God may have “as part of His reason for permitting a given case of suffer-
ing that it contributes to results that extend beyond the sufferer.  So long as the 
sufferer is amply taken care of, I can’t see that this violates any demands of divine 
justice, compassion, or love” (my emphasis).  While the requirement for a patient-
FHQWHUHGMXVWL¿FDWLRQPD\QRWEHQHFHVVDULO\SUHGLFDWHGRQ3,%LWLVGRXEWIXOWKDW
DPRWLYHIRUWKHUHTXLUHPHQWZRXOGEHVLJQL¿FDQWO\GLIIHUHQWIURP3,%
6 Recall that it is an open question as to whether or not Dole enjoys G-for-
HDole.
7 Assuming, not uncontroversially, that counterfactuals of freedom have 
truth-value and that God has knowledge of such truth-values.
8 I leave for another day the question of whether or not the denial of PIB—
the denial of impartial EHQHYROHQFH²LVFRPSDWLEOHZLWKDQDI¿UPDWLRQRIGLYLQH
omni-benevolence.
Works Cited
Alston, William. (1996)  The Inductive Argument from Evil and the Human Cog-
nitive Condition.  In Daniel Howard-Synder (ed.), The Evidential Argument 
from Evil (pp. 97-125).  Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University 
Press.
Lewis, C. S.  (2001)  The Problem of Pain.  New York: HarperCollins.
Rowe, William.  (1996)  The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism. In 
Daniel Howard-Synder (ed.), The Evidential Argument from Evil (pp. 1-11). 
Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.
———.  (2004)  Evil is Evidence Against Theistic Belief.  In Michael L. Peterson 
and Raymond J. VanArragon (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of 
Religion.  Oxford: Blackwell.
Stump, Eleonore.  (1985)  The Problem of Evil.  Faith and Philosophy 2(4): 392-
435.
Swinburne, Richard.  (1998)  Providence and the Problem of Evil.  Oxford: Clar-
endon Press.
